We describe a methodology to automatically turn arbitrary ARMv8 programs into alphanumeric executable polymorphic shellcodes. Shellcodes generated in this way can evade detection and bypass filters, broadening the attack surface of ARM-powered devices such as smartphones.
techniques. [7] was shortly followed by RIX [17] on the IA32 architecture. Mason et al. [10] designed shellcodes using only English words to bypass IDS filters. Obscou [13] managed to obtain Unicode-proof shellcodes that work despite the limitation that no zero-character can appear in the middle of a standard C string. All the above constructions built on existing shellcode writing approaches and required manual fine-tuning.
Basu et al. [2] developed an algorithm for automated shellcode generation targeting the x86 architecture. The Metasploit project provides the msfvenom utility, which can turn arbitrary x86 programs into alphanumeric x86 code. Both UPX 1 and msfvenom can generate self-decrypting ARM executables, yet neither provide alphanumeric encodings for this platform.
More recently, Younan et al. generated alphanumeric shellcodes for the ARMv5 architecture [21, 22] . They provide a proof that the subset of alphanumeric commands is Turing-complete, by translating all BF [5, 8, 16] commands into alphanumeric ARM code snippets.
Our contribution
This paper describes, to the best of the authors' knowledge, the first program turning arbitrary ARMv8 code into alphanumeric executable code. The technique is generic and may well apply to other architectures. Besides solving a technical challenge, our tools produce valid shellcodes that can be used to try and take control of a device.
Our global approach is the following: we first identify a subset Σ of minimal Turing-complete alphanumeric instructions, and use Σ to write an in-memory decoder. The payload is encoded offline (with an algorithm that only outputs alphanumeric characters), and is integrated into the decoder. The whole package is therefore an alphanumeric program, and allows for arbitrary code execution. All source files are provided in the appendices.
Preliminaries 2.1 Notations and definitions
Throughout this paper, a string will be defined as alphanumeric if it only contains upper-case or lower-case letters of the English alphabet, and numbers from 0 to 9 included. When writing alphanumeric code, spaces and return characters are added for reading convenience but are not part of the actual code. Words are 32-bit long. We call polymorphic, a code that can be mutated using a polymorphic engine into another one with the same semantics.
When dealing with numbers we use the following convention: plain numbers are in base 10, numbers prefixed by 0x are in hexadecimal format, and numbers prefixed by 0b are in binary format. The little-endian convention is used throughout this paper for alphanumeric code, to remain consistent with ARMv8 internals. However, registers will be considered as double-words or words; each 32-bit register W = W high W low is split into a most significant 16 bits half-word W high and a least significant 16 bits W low . S[i] denotes i-th byte 2 of a string S.
Vulnerable applications and platforms
To attempt a buffer overflow attack, we assume that there exists a vulnerable application on the target device. Smartphone applications are good candidates because (1) they can easily be written in languages that do not check array bounds; and (2) they can be spread to many users via application marketplaces. Note that on Android platforms, applications are often written in Java which implements implicit bound checking. At first glance it may seem that this protects Java applications from buffer overflow attacks. However, it is possible to access C/C++ code libraries via the Java Native Interface (JNI), for performance reasons. Such vulnerabilities were exposed in the JDK [19] .
ARMv8 AArch64
AArch64 is a new ARM-v8A instruction set. AArch64 features 32 general purpose 64-bit registers Xi (0 ≤ i < 32) and 32 registers for floating-point numbers. All instructions are 32-bit long. The 32 LSBs of each Xi is a word denoted by Wi. These words are used directly in many instructions. Younan et al. [22] use the fact that, in AArch32 (32-bits ARM architecture), almost all instructions can be executed conditionally via a condition code checked against the CPSR register. In AArch64, this is not the case anymore. Only specific instructions, such as branches, can be made conditional: this renders Younan et al.'s approach inoperant.
Each instruction is made of an opcode and zero or more operands, where opcode gives the instruction to perform and operands may consist in addresses, register numbers, or constants. As an example, the instruction:
is assembled as 0x58303030 3 and decoded as follows [1] :
Bits 0 to 4 encode the reference number of a 64-bit register Xt. Bits 5 to 23 encode the immediate value imm19, which is a relative offset counted in words (a single word is 32-bit long).
An interesting feature is that immediate values and registers often follow each other in instructions, as is the case here for imm19 and Xt. This is a real advantage for creating alphanumeric shellcodes, as it indicates that instructions who share a prefix are probably related. For instance 000X and 100X turn out to decode respectively into ldr x16 , PC +0 x60604 and ldr x17 , PC +0 x60604
Thus it is relatively easy to modify the operands of an existing instruction.
Shellcodes
A shellcode is a set of machine code instructions injected into a running program. To that end, an attacker would for instance exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability. The attacker could insert executable code into the stack, and control the current stack frame's return address. As a result, when the victim program's current function returns, the attacker's code is executed. Other strategies might be employed to achieve that goal, but the stack frame hack is well known and we will use for simplicity.
It is common practice to flood the buffer with a nopsled, i.e. a sequence of useless operations, which has the added benefit of allowing some imprecision in the return address.
Shellcodes may execute directly, or employ some form of evasion strategy such as filter evasion, encryption or polymorphism. The latter allows having a large number of different shellcodes that have the same effect, which decreases their traceability. In these cases the payload must be encoded in a specific way, and decode itself at runtime.
In this work, we encode the payload in a filter-friendly way and equip it with a decoder (or vector ). The vector itself must be filter-friendly, and is usually handwritten.
Hence designing a shellcode is a tricky art.
Building the Instruction Set
Some ARM instructions are alphanumeric. To find these, we generated all 14,776,336 alphanumeric 32-bit words using the custom-made program provided in Appendix A. This gave 4-byte values that were then tentatively disassembled using objdump 4 for the AArch64 architecture, in the hope that these chunks correspond to valid and interesting instructions. For instance, the word 000X corresponds to an ldr instruction:
Alphanumeric words that do not correspond to any valid instruction ("undefined") were removed from our set. For instance, the word 000S is not a valid instruction:
.inst 0 x; undefined
Valid instructions were finally classified as pertaining to data processing, branch, load/store, etc. At this step we established a first list A 0 of all valid alphanumeric AArch64 instructions.
From A 0 , we constructed a set A 1 of opcodes for which there exists at least one operand instance making it alphanumeric. A 1 is given in Appendix B.
Finally, we extracted from A 1 only those instructions which we could use to prototype higher-level constructs. This final list is called A max .
Data processing
The following instructions belong to A max : The constraint that the sf bit must be set to 0 restricts us to using only the 32-bit variant of most instructions. This makes modifying the upper 32 bits of a register harder.
Branches
Only conditional jumps are available:
It is quite easy to turn a conditional jump into a non-conditional jump. However, only tbz and its opposite tbnz have a realistic use for loops. The three other instructions require an offset too large to be useful.
Exceptions and system
Neither exceptions nor system instructions are available. This means that we cannot use syscalls, nor clear the instruction or data cache. This makes writing higher-level code challenging and implementation-dependent.
Load and stores
Many load and stores instructions can be alphanumeric. This requires fine tuning to achieve the desired result, as limitations on the various load and store instructions are not consistent across registers.
SIMD, floating point and crypto
No floating point or cryptographic instruction is alphanumeric. Some SIMD are available, but the instructions moving data between SIMD and general purposes registers are not alphanumeric. This limits the use of such instructions to very specific cases.
Therefore, we did not include any of these instructions in A max .
Higher-level constructs
A real-world program may need information about the state of registers and memory, including the program counter and processor flags. This information is not immediately obtainable using A max . We overcome this difficulty by providing higher-level constructs, which can then be combined to form more complex programs. Indeed it turns out that A max is Turing-complete. Those higher-level constructs also make easier to build polymorphic programs, given that several low-level implementations are available for each construct.
Registers operations

Zeroing a register
There are multiple ways of setting an AArch64 register to zero. One of them which is alphanumeric and works well on many registers consists in using two and instructions with shifted registers. However, we only manage to reset the register's 32 LSBs. This becomes an issue when dealing with addresses for instance.
As an example, to reset w17 low , execute:
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16 ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
This corresponds to the code 1BQj1BQj. 
Loading arbitrary values into a register
Loading a value into a register is the cornerstone of any program. Unfortunately there is no direct way to perform a load directly using only alphanumeric instructions. We hence used an indirect strategy. Using adds and subs with the available immediate constants, we can increment and decrement registers. One of the constraints is that this immediate constant must be quite large. Thus, we selected two consecutive constants, using an adds/subs pair. By repeating this operation we can set registers to arbitrary values.
For instance, to add 1 to the register w11 we can use: adds w11 , w11 , #0 xc1a subs w11 , w11 , #0 xc19
which is encoded by ki01ke0q. And similarly to subtract 1:
which is encoded by ki0qke01.
The following table summarizes the available increment and decrement operations:
Bh01Bd0q Bh0qBd01 w3 ch01cd0q ch0qcd01 w10 Ji01Je0q Ji0qJe01 w11 ki01ke0q ki0qke01 w17 1j011f0q 1j0q1f01 w18 Rj01Rf0q Rj0qRf01 w19 sj01sf0q sj0qsf01 w25 9k019g0q 9k0q9g01 w26 Zk01Zg0q Zk0qZg01
We manually selected registers and constants to achieve the desired value. However, it would be much more efficient to solve a knapsack problem, if one were to do this at a larger scale. As we will see later on, the values above are sufficient for our needs.
Moving a register
Moving a register A into B can be performed in two steps: first we set the destination register to zero, and then we xor it with the source register. The xor operation is described in Section 4.2.1.
Another method for moving w11 into w16 is the following:
adds w17 , w11 , #0 xc10 subs w16 , w17 , #0 xc10
which is encoded by qA010B0q. We will later use this approach to design a logical and operation.
Bitwise operations
Exclusive OR
The xor operation B ← A ⊕ B can be performed as follows: We split the two input registers into their higher and lower half-words, and use a temporary register C.
This gives the following code: For c = w17, the following instructions can be used:
Logical NOT
We use the fact that ¬b = b ⊕ (−1) which relies on negative number being represented in the usual two's complement format. Thus we can use the operations described previously:
Logical AND
The and operation is more intricate and requires three temporary registers C, E, and F . We manage to do it by anding the lower and the upper parts of the two operands into a third register as follows: This is an alphanumeric program which we can write more compactly as: We provide in Appendix C a program generating more instructions of this type.
Load and Store operations
There are several load and stores instructions available in A max . We will only focus or ldrb (which loads a byte into a register) and strb (which stores the low byte of a register into memory). ldrb is available with the basic addressing mode: ldrb wA, [xP, #n] which loads the byte at address xP+n into wA. To use this instruction we must use a value of n that makes the whole alphanumeric, but this is not a truly limiting constraint. Moreover, we can chain different values of n to load consecutive bytes from memory without modifying xP.
Another addressing mode which can be used is ldrb wA, [xP, wQ, uxtx] . This will extend the 32-bits register wQ into a 64 bit one, padding the high bits with zeros, which removes the need for an offset.
As These two instructions correspond to the alphanumeric executable code Y5A9yI38.
Pointer arithmetic
32-bit address case
As we mentioned previously we only control the lower 32 bits of XP with data processing instructions. Thus, if addresses are in the 4 GB range, we can use the data-instructions seen previously to add 1, load the next byte, and loop on it.
64-bit address case
If the address does not fit into 32 bits, any use of data instructions will clear the 32 upper bits. Thus, we need a different approach.
We use another addressing mode which reads a byte from the source register, and adds a constant to it. This addition is performed over 64-bits. As an example, we read a byte from x10+1 and increment x10:
The same limitations apply to strb.
Branch operations
A max contains several branch instructions, however there are severe restrictions on the minimum offset we can use, since this offset must be alphanumeric. For this reason we will only use the tbz and tbnz instructions. The tbz (test and branch if zero) is given three operands: a bit b, a register Rt and a 14-bit immediate value imm14. If the b th bit of register Rt is equal to zero, then tbz jumps to an offset imm14.
There is a tradeoff here since we cannot easily control individual bits. We chose the smallest offset value, at the expense of restricting our choice for Rt and b. tbnz works symmetrically and jumps if the tested bit equals 1.
We can turn tbz into an unconditional jump by using a register that has been set to zero. Conditional jumps require that we control a specific register bit, which is trickier.
The smallest forward jump offset we can encode is by 1540 bytes, and the smallest backward jump offset is 4276 bytes.
The maximal offset reachable with any of these instructions is less than 1 MB.
Fully Alphanumeric AArch64
The building blocks we described so far could be used to assemble complex programs from the bottom up. However, even though many building blocks could be designed in theory, in practice we get quickly limited by branching, system instructions and function calls: Turing-completeness is not enough. We circumvent this limitation by first encoding the payload P as an alphanumeric string. Decoding is performed in-memory by a vector program written only with instructions drawn from A max , leveraging the higher-level constructs of the previous section. Finally, the decoded payload is executed.
The encoder E was implemented in PHP, with the corresponding decoder D implemented as part of the vector with instructions from A max only. Finally, we implemented a linker L D that embeds the encoded payload in D. This operation results in an alphanumeric program A ← L D (E(P )).
The Encoder
Since we have 62 alphanumeric characters, it is theoretically possible to encode almost 6 bits per alphanumeric byte. However, to keep D short, we only encode 4 bits per alphanumeric byte. This spreads each binary byte of the payload P over 2 alphanumeric consecutive characters.
E splits the upper and lower part of the input byte P [i] and adds 0x40 to each nibble:
Zero is encoded in a special way: the above encoding would give 0x40 i.e. the character '@', which does not belong to our alphanumeric character set. We add 0x10 to the previously computed a[k] to transform it into a 0x50 which corresponds to 'P'. The encoder's source code is provided in Appendix D.
The Decoder
Decoding is straightforward, but because D must itself be an alphanumeric program some tricks must be used. Our solution is to use the following snippet:
/* Input : A and B. Z is 0 . Output : B */ eon wA , wZ , wA , lsl #20 ands wB , wB , #0 xFFFF000F eon wB , wB , wA , lsr #16
The first eon shifts wA 20 bits to the left and negates it, since wZ is zero:
The ands is used to keep only the 4 lowest bits of wB. The reason why the pattern 0xFFFF000F is used (rather than the straightforward 0xF) is that the instruction ands wB, wB, 0xFFFF000F is alphanumeric, whereas ands wB, wB, 0xF is not. The last eon performs the following operation: wB is xored with the negation of wA shifted 16 bits right, thus recovering the 4 upper bits.
wB ← wB ⊕ ¬(wA 2 16)
It is natural to wish D to be as small as possible. However, given that the smallest backward jump requires an offset of 4276 bytes, D cannot possibly be smaller than 4276 bytes.
Payload Delivery
The encoded payload is embedded directly in D's main loop. D will decode the encoded payload until completion (cf. Figure 1) , and will then jumps into the decoded payload (cf. Figure 2) .
To implement the main loop we need two jump offsets: one forward offset large enough to jump over the encoded payload, and one even larger backward offset to return to the decoding loop. The smallest available backward offset satisfying these constraints is selected, alongside with the largest forward offset smaller than the chosen backward offset. Extra space is padded with nop-like instructions.
The decoder's source code is provided in Appendix E. 
Assembly and machine code
Note that there is no bijection between machine code and assembly. As an example, 0x72304F39 (9O0r) is disassembled as ands W25 , W25 , #0 xFFFF000F but this very instruction, when assembled back, gives 0x72104F39 (9O.r), which is not alphanumeric.
Structurally, 9O0r and 9O.r are equivalent. However, only the latter is chosen by the assembler. Thus, to ensure that our generated code is indeed alphanumeric we had to put directly this instruction's word representation in the assembly code. Using the fact that registers fields are contiguous, simple arithmetic allowed us to compute the right word directly from the register number.
Polymorphic shellcode
It is possible to add partial polymorphism to both the vector and the payload using our approach. This allows the shellcode evading basic pattern matching detection methods [4] but more specific techniques can be applied here in order to fool more recent IDS [18] .
The payload can be mutated using the fact that only the last 4 bits of each byte contains information about the payload, allowing us to modify the first 4 bytes arbitrarily, as long as the instructions still remain alphanumeric. This gives a total polymorphism of the payload as shown by the polymorphic engine provided Appendix G, which mutates each byte into between two and five possibilities. Moreover, the padding following the payload is also mutated with the same code. The NOP sled can also be made totally polymorphic. Indeed, a trivial search reveals more than 80 thousands instructions that could be used as NOP instructions in our shellcode.
The vector is made partially polymorphic by creating different versions of each high level construct. The two easiest ones being the ones defined in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, which have both been implemented. Indeed, in order to zero a register, it is possible replace the shift value by anything in the set {16..30} \ {23} . The same idea can be applied to increasing or decreasing a register, in which the immediate value can be replaced by any other constant keeping the instruction alphanumeric (the values are in the range 0xc0c -0xe5c, with some gaps in between). We show as an example a polymorphic engine that mutates the zeroing a register construct in appendix G. Those two techniques are enough to mutate 9 over 25 instructions of the decoder, and by counting the NOPs and the payload, we have that 4256 over 4320 bytes of the shellcode are polymorphic.
Experimental results
On ARM, when memory is overwritten, the I-cache is not invalidated. This hampers the execution of self-rewriting code, and has to be circumvented: we need to flush the I-cache for our shellcode to work. Unfortunately the dedicated instruction to do that is not alphanumeric 5 .
More precisely, there are only two situations where this is an issue:
• Execution of the decoder;
• Jump to the decoded payload.
Our concern mostly lies with the second point. Fortunately, it is sufficient that the first instructions be not in the cache (i.e. that cache be flushed with the first instructions). This enables us to make this shellcode work on a given ARM core. However, cache management is implementation-dependent when it comes to details, making our code less portable. In practice, as the L1 cache is split into a data L1 and a instruction L1, we never ran into a cache coherency issue.
QEMU
As a proof-of-concept, we tested the code with QEMU [3] , disregarding the above discussion on cache issues. Moreover, as addresses are below the 4 GB barrier, we can easily perform pointer arithmetic. We provide in Appendix F the output of our tool, where the input is a simple program printing "Hello World!". The result can be easily tested using the parameters given in Appendix F.
DragonBoard 410c
We then moved to real hardware. The DragonBoard 410c [15] is an AArch64-based board with a Snapdragon 410 SoC. This SoC contains ARM Cortex A53 64-bit processor. This processor is widely used (in the Raspberry Pi 3 among many others) and is thus representative of the AArch64 world. We installed Debian 8.0 (Jessie) and were successfully able to run a version of our shellcode. We had no issue with the I-cache: As we do not execute code on the same page we write, the cache handler does not predict we are going to branch there.
Apple iPhone
In this work we focused on the Apple iPhone 6 running iOS 8. Most iOS 8 applications are developed in the memory-unsafe Objective-C language, and recent research seems to indicate the pervasiveness of vulnerabilities [20] [12] , all the more so since a unicode exploit on CoreText 6 working on early iOS 8 has been released, which consists in a corruption of a pointer being then dereferenced.
We build an iPhone application to test our approach. For the sake of credibility, we shaped our scenario on existing applications that are currently available on the Apple Store. Thus, although we made the application vulnerable on purpose, we stress that such a vulnerability could realistically be found in the wild.
Namely, the scenario is as follows:
• The application loads some statically compiled scripts, which are based on players parameters
• It also interprets the downloaded scripts (they cannot be compiled per Apple guidelines)
• Downloaded scripts (for example scripts made by users) are sanity-checked (must be printable characters: blanks + 0x20-0x7E range)
• Thus, there is an array of tuples {typeOfScript, p} where typeOfScript indicates interpreted script or JIT compiled executable code, and p is a pointer to the aforementioned script or code.
• A subtle bug enables an attacker to assign the wrong type of script in certain cases
• Thus we can force our evil user-script to be considered as executable code instead of interpretable script.
• Therefore our shellcode gets called as a function directly.
From then on, the decoder retrieves the payload and uses a gadget to change the page permissions from "write" to "read-exec" 7 , and executes it.
In this proof-of-concept, our shellcode only changes the return value of a function, displaying an incorrect string on the screen.
Conclusion
We described a methodology as well as a generic framework to turn arbitrary code into an (equivalent) executable alphanumeric program for ARMv8 platforms. To the best of our knowledge, no such tools are available for this platform, and up to this point most constructions were only theoretical.
Our final construction relies on a fine-grained understanding of ARMv8 specifics, yet the overall strategy is not restricted to that processor, and may certainly be transposed to address other architectures and constraints.
D Encoder's Source Code
We give here the encoder's full source code. This program is written in PHP. 
E Decoder's Source Code
We give here the decoder's full source code. This code is pre-processed by m4 [9] which performs macro expansion. The payload program to decode has to be be placed at the pool offset. 
F Hello World Shellcode
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G Polymorphic engine
The following shows two modifications that make the code partly polymorphic. The first one is a modification of the encoder, that will randomize both the payload and the remaining blank space. The second one is an example of adding polymorphism for zeroing a register using a Haskell engine. 
